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ABSTRACT: Romantic love and its predecessor 
 
eros
 
 have both been characterized
as forms of egoistic love. Part of this claim is concerned specifically with the relation
between love and knowledge. Real love, it is claimed, is prior to knowledge and is not
motivated by it. Romantic love and 
 
eros
 
 according to this view are egoistic in that
they are motivated by a desire for knowledge. Agapic love characterized by bestowal
represents a true form of love unmotivated by selfish desires. I argue that such an
emphasis on bestowal at the expense of knowledge or appraisal of the beloved is prob-
lematic. The knowledge dimension of romantic love, rather than contributing to self-
ishness, can be a means of freeing us from egoism when we understand identity in its
relational or social form.
RÉSUMÉ : L’amour romantique et son prédécesseur, Éros, sont tous deux con-
sidérés comme des formes d’amour égoïste. Une partie de cette prétention concerne
spécifiquement le lien entre l’amour et la connaissance : l’amour véritable précède
la connaissance et n’est pas motivé par elle. Selon ce point de vue, l’amour roman-
tique et Éros sont égoïstes parce qu’ils sont motivés par le désir de connaître.
L’amour agapique d’autre part se caractérise par le don; il représente une forme
d’amour véritable que ne motive aucun désir égoïste. Cet accent mis sur le don au
détriment de la connaissance ou de l’appréciation de l’être aimé se révèle pourtant
problématique. La connaissance, qui caractérise l’amour romantique, représente un
moyen de nous libérer de l’égoïsme au lieu de l’alimenter, lorsque nous acquérons une
compréhension de l’identité sous sa forme relationnelle et sociale. 
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Introduction
 
Writing in the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes presents us with a
simple yet highly influential account of  desire and the role that it plays in
human life. For Hobbes, all that we do, no matter how base or how cul-
tured, can be explained by our desires and our aversions. We are con-
stantly driven to fulfill these desires, so much so that we remain in a state
of  desire, never finding satisfaction. In fact, love itself  reduces to a partic-
ular form of  desire on Hobbes’s account.
 
That which men Desire, they are also sayd to LOVE: and to HATE those things,
for which they have Aversion. So that Desire, and Love, are the same thing; save
that by Desire, we always signifie the Absence of  the Object; by Love, most
commonly the presence of  the same. So also by Aversion, we signifie the
Absence; and by Hate, the Presence of  the Object.
 
1
 
The idea that love is a form of  desire is certainly not a modern notion.
Long before Hobbes, Plato, in his 
 
Symposium
 
, characterized love in terms
of 
 
eros
 
, a form of  love which ultimately desires wisdom or beauty, but
which in its less-developed form desires inferior representations of  beauty
and truth such as we see in the human body, artifacts, and common wis-
dom. Here, the desire that characterizes love is (ultimately) not aimed at
a specific object, which can be present or absent, but at a different kind of
thing. For Plato, beauty, knowledge, truth, and wisdom are not objects
with which we can try to satisfy the insatiable desires of  the kind of  beings
that Hobbes took us to be. What we get with Plato is the notion that there
is an ultimate aim of  love. This aim is not personal or particular in the
sense of  being aimed at a particular individual or object of  our desire. The
desire that characterizes 
 
eros
 
 is the desire for knowledge, the universal, the
true, that which gives us true or lasting satisfaction because it frees us from
a dependence on the contingent, changing nature of  earthly life, a life, I
might add, that is filled with particulars.
In Western thinking the concept of  love characterized by 
 
eros 
 
has been
opposed historically by the Christian notion of  love understood in terms
of  
 
agapé
 
. The life attitude expressed by 
 
agapé
 
 views 
 
eros 
 
as a selfish or ego-
istic form of  love, and, in its extreme expression, as a sinful, degenerate
ideal. Attempts have been made to reconcile these two views of  love, per-
haps most notably in the Middle Ages in the Platonic-Christian philoso-
phy of  St. Augustine. Augustine used the term 
 
caritas 
 
to characterize love.
This notion of  love was neither 
 
agapé 
 
nor 
 
eros 
 
but was rather a synthesis
of  the two.
 
2
 
 Irving Singer, in his three-volume work entitled 
 
The Nature
of Love
 
, characterizes the history of  love in the West in terms of  the con-
flicts to which these two notions give rise and attempts at their reconcili-
ation. For Singer, the general attitude expressed by 
 
eros
 
 is best understood
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in terms of  appraisal. Agapic love, on the other hand, is characterized in
terms of  bestowal.
 
3
 
 The love of  God is one which is freely given or
bestowed upon humankind. It is unmotivated or, perhaps, to put it in
modern moral terms, disinterested. Erotic love, on the other hand, relies
on some objective quality or qualities in the beloved or object of  love
which serve as the basis of  evaluation or appraisal.
A more modern attempt at reconciling concepts of  love is expressed in
the notion of  romantic love. Romantic love is not a single, simple, coher-
ent idea but rather characterizes the views of  a number of  philosophers
and writers, particularly those from the nineteenth century. Likewise,
romantic love, as opposed to 
 
caritas
 
, is not a straightforward attempt at
reconciling 
 
eros 
 
and 
 
agapé
 
. Romantic love is perhaps better understood
as more pluralistic both in terms of  its sources and its aim. This view of
love is also influenced by courtly love as well as divergent philosophical
traditions broadly characterized in terms of  the oppositions realist/ideal-
ist and empiricist/rationalist.
 
4
 
 Although some conceptions of  romantic
love attempt to reconcile or synthesize previous forms of  love, the notion
of  reconciliation is perhaps better used to describe the aim of  romantic
love. Romantic love, in its various forms, is better characterized in terms
of  a type of  reconciliation between lovers rather than a reconciliation of
loves. This reconciliation however, is greatly shaped by previous concep-
tions of  love and the accompanying conceptions of  human nature. Rec-
onciliation between lovers involves both an element of  appraisal and a
sense of  bestowal.
As mentioned earlier, one of  the main criticisms of  erotic love coming
from adherents of  the agapic view is that such love is selfish. This criticism
often extends to romantic love, which has been significantly shaped by the
erotic tradition. One form that this selfishness takes can be characterized
in terms of  a quest for knowledge. Romantic love and 
 
eros
 
 have both been
characterized as attempts to gain knowledge of  the other person, or of
truth and beauty, rather than freely bestowing love on another person or
loving them for their own sake.
 
5
 
 In this article I want to defend romantic
love against the claim that it is an inherently selfish form of  love and, as
such, is morally deficient. I agree that romantic love, like 
 
eros
 
, aims (at
least in part) at a kind of  knowledge, but such an aim in itself  does not
render this form of  love selfish in any problematic way. I believe that
knowledge is and must be part of  any healthy form of  human love. In
this sense I agree with Singer who claims that some form of  appraisal
(knowledge-based) must accompany the bestowal aspect of  love. The
importance of  knowledge in love becomes apparent when we acknowledge
the relational nature of  romantic love and the effect that this relational
aspect has on the identities of  both lover and beloved.
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Romantic Love and the Problem of Egoism
 
Max Scheler and a number of  other Christian thinkers have characterized
romantic love, as well as its predecessor 
 
eros
 
,
 
 
 
as forms of  egoism. One
aspect of  the egoistic character of  these forms of  love according to Scheler
is their retrospective nature. 
 
Eros
 
 aims at recollecting or re-appropriating
knowledge which we once had of  truth and beauty. Romantic love aims at
completing our self  through a relationship with another person. In both
cases love aims at some good that is a good for one’s self  and that makes
us more whole or complete. The retrospective aspect of  romantic love has
to do with the idea that we are reconciling our own self  with the self  of
someone else, and, in so doing, overcoming the alienating effects of  the
 
principium individuationis
 
. It may not be our “lost half,” as expressed by
Aristophanes in 
 
Symposium
 
, with whom we are seeking reconciliation,
but it is a reconciliation with the other side of  our self, as Jean-Paul Sartre
has described: we are seeking to know or to experience that object side of
our self  which Sartre tells us is our own, but which escapes our experience
of  it.
 
6
 
 We require an other in order to experience this object-self  from
which we have been separated because of  a lapse or a fall. According to
romanticism, human beings have experienced a fall through the develop-
ment of  consciousness, a fall which has undone a more primordial unity
of  experience. Since this fall, we experience the world in terms of  subject
and object. When we begin to reflect, we experience our “self” as being
separate from the world of  objects, including our own body.
 
7
 
 In light of  this
a central aim of romantic love is to restore a kind of  unity in our being, a
wholeness which allows us once again to experience both sides of  our self. 
Scheler notes that the movement of  this kind of  love is a movement from
the lower (humankind) to the higher (the divine), in contrast to 
 
agapé
 
,
which moves from the higher to the lower.
 
8
 
 Anders Nygren, in his 
 
Agapé
and Eros
 
, likewise highlights this contrast and discusses the significance of
it.
 
9
 
 The movement from lower to higher, characteristic of  
 
eros
 
, is a move-
ment of  desire. Here love desires true beauty, even though many individ-
uals are capable of  experiencing only derivative forms of  beauty. With
romantic love the movement is from a lower to a higher form of  unity or
completeness. In each case it is the self  which is set on fulfilling a desire or
set of  desires. With 
 
agapé
 
, however, the movement comes from that which
is unified, perfect, ideal, and moves to the less perfect or less whole. One
of the distinguishing features of  this form of  love, according to Nygren,
lies in the claim that it is unmotivated. Unlike 
 
eros 
 
and romantic love,
which are motivated by a desire for or toward something, 
 
agapé
 
 is a spon-
taneously creative act of  God, emanating from his character and not moti-
vated by the value of  the objects of  his love. 
For Scheler, the selfishness or egoism of  
 
eros
 
 and romantic love is seen
as a fault. This fault rests on a “deep metaphysical error . . . that love is
no more than an intuitive knowledge of  the unity of  being.”
 
10
 
 Knowledge,
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in this scheme, precedes love and in fact motivates love. Scheler denies that
this is real love. Real love is not motivated by self-gain, whether this gain
is in terms of  knowledge or unity. Christian love, according to Scheler,
reverses the relation between love and knowledge. Love, rather than
expressing a desire for knowledge, becomes a principle which is prior to
knowing. It is more important to love according to the Christian faith
than it is to have correct knowledge. Action, loving one’s neighbour, which
is the only true way to love God, is what counts. This love cannot be moti-
vated by a desire for gain or even by a legal requirement. It must be an
expression of  who one is as a Christian. We see a similar view put forward
by the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard in his 
 
Works of Love
 
.
According to Kierkegaard, erotic love and friendship are forms of  prefer-
ential love. They are selfish. It is only when these forms of  love have been
purified by Christian love—with the love of  “love thy neighbour”—that
they can be considered true forms of  love.
 
11
 
 Only then can one experience
a repetition of  such loves from a new, higher perspective on life. 
For both Kierkegaard and Scheler, the difference between these types of
love reveals a deficiency in 
 
eros
 
 and its descendent romantic love. Nygren,
on the other hand, claims only to be describing two different systems of
evaluation but not appraising them. He refrains from anachronistically
judging 
 
eros
 
 according to the transvaluation brought about by the influ-
ence of  
 
agapé 
 
in Western culture, which in itself  has coloured the meaning
of terms such as “selfish,” “egocentric,” and so on. Nygren instead chooses
to view these as two systems of  valuation which reflect two different “gen-
eral attitudes to life.”
 
12
 
 These two attitudes are incompatible, according to
Nygren, Scheler, and Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard, however, makes room for
compatibility, but only once 
 
eros 
 
has been subordinated to Christian love. 
Harry Frankfurt presents another view of  love which clearly falls in the
tradition of  bestowal. Although Frankfurt does not characterize his
notion of  love in terms of  
 
agapé
 
, it is clear that it shares with the agapic
tradition the idea that love must be a gift or creation of  the lover and not
a response to or evaluation of  qualities in the beloved. What motivates
Frankfurt’s emphasis on love as bestowal is his rejection of  what Niko
Kolodny calls the “quality theory” of  love and the accompanying idea that
there are “reasons for love.” The main problem with the quality theory is
that by making love for another person dependent on non-relational fea-
tures or qualities of  the person, one implies that this person could be
replaced by another with those same qualities.
 
13
 
 In 
 
The Reasons of Love
 
,
Frankfurt characterizes love as “a 
 
disinterested 
 
concern for the existence
of  what is loved, and for what is good for it.”
 
14
 
 This disinterested concern
implies that the lover’s love is not based on qualities of  the beloved which
will benefit her. Disinterested love is bestowed on the beloved as a kind of
gift. In this sense, Frankfurt’s love resembles the love of  God which is
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unmotivated. It does not depend on objective qualities in the beloved for
its motivation. 
Frankfurt does not claim that God is the source of  this form of  love but
rather characterizes it in more naturalistic terms: “the explanation pre-
sumably lies in the evolutionary pressures of  natural selection.”
 
15
 
 For
Frankfurt, the paradigm cases of  such love are the love of  a parent for a
child or the love one has for one’s self. Self-love, according to Frankfurt,
is disinterested in the sense that, like the love for one’s child, one loves the
beloved (in this case one’s self ) for his or her own sake and not for the sake
of  some other end. Just as one loves or affirms the goals of  another (the
goals that characterize the other’s self ), so one loves or affirms one’s own
goals or one’s own self. Of  course this is a strange and potentially inco-
herent application of  Frankfurt’s own concept of  love since we normally
distinguish interest from disinterest in terms of  a relation to the self. Self-
interest in this sense seems to be implied by self-love. The love which one
has for one’s own self  cannot be disinterested in the way that one’s love
can be for someone else. By definition, an element of  self-interest (as
opposed to disinterest) pervades the relationship of  self-love.
 
16
 
 But this
problem aside, Frankfurt’s view gives us an example of  bestowal love
which bases itself  more on an ethical attitude than a religious-ethical one.
This ethical attitude is motivated by non-egoistic concerns but does not
find the source of  this concern in a deity.
Frankfurt’s concern here is an ethical one, even though he suggests that
the explanation probably lies in evolution. The disinterested aspect of  love
calls to mind Christian 
 
agapé
 
, Aristotle’s highest form of  friendship, and
Kant’s categorical imperative where we are told to treat people as ends and
never merely as means. With Frankfurt we get a conception of  love which
tries to avoid egoism, but does so without invoking a supernatural source.
Frankfurt relies on an ethical conception of  love which invokes disinterest
as its central feature. Love in its purest form, according to Frankfurt, can-
not be based on appraisal, but rather is an act of  bestowal on the part of
the lover. Appraisal for Frankfurt pulls us in the direction of  loving our
beloved instrumentally or for the sake of  some other interest. He views the
truest or most authentic form of  love as one which is outside the realm of
appraisal.
Emmanuel Levinas, while not discussing love specifically, characterizes
the relation between self  and other in ethical terms as well and in so doing
introduces the issue of  knowledge with which I will be concerned later in
this article. For Levinas, the primary relationship between self  and other
cannot be one of  knowledge but is rather an ethical relation. In essays
such as “Is Ontology Fundamental?” and “Transcendence and Height,”
Levinas argues (in a somewhat hyperbolic manner) that the act of  char-
acterizing the other in terms of  knowledge is an act of  violence. To expe-
rience the other as an object of  knowledge is to subsume the other under
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a concept or concepts. This reduces the other to a mere means of  one’s
own understanding, thus violating the Kantian imperative, which Levinas
sees as important to his own ethical philosophy. For Levinas, the primacy
of  knowledge in relation to the other represents a form of  egoism on the
part of  the self. The true ethical relationship frees itself  from the desire to
dominate represented by knowing and allows the other the freedom to
exist as a separate and unknowable being (free from the limitations of  the
concepts that one imposes on the other).
 
17
 
 
What the preceding thinkers share in common is a view of  love that
seeks to free itself  from egoism or an unhealthy form of  self-interest. In
order to do so, love and the ethical relationship between self  and other
must be seen in terms of  a kind of  bestowal that is unmotivated by objec-
tive qualities that reside or are perceived to reside in the other. On this
view, romantic love and 
 
eros 
 
are disqualified as authentic or true forms of
love. Both of  these forms of  love rely in different ways on an appraisal or
evaluation of  the beloved or they rely on attaining knowledge of  one’s self
or the other through the love relationship. 
 
Romantic Love as More than Appraisal and Bestowal
 
Perhaps one of  the most philosophically interesting characterizations of
the problem that knowledge creates for love is to be found in the early
writings of  Jean-Paul Sartre. Even though Sartre suggests a more positive
view of  love later on in his 
 
Notebook for an Ethics
 
,
 
18
 
 he was never able to
fully develop this idea in his lifetime.
 
 
 
In 
 
Being and Nothingness
 
 Sartre
assumes the framework of  romantic love that we have discussed above
and, based on this model, concludes that love sets forth a contradictory
ideal. Sartre believed that such love is doomed to failure because lovers
engage in the impossible task of  trying to capture the freedom of  each
other or to treat that freedom as an object while still wanting the beloved
to remain free. We want somehow to capture the subjective side of  another
person in order to gain knowledge of  our self  or to experience our own
objective nature. Likewise the other person wants to gain knowledge of
her own object self  through the experience of  capturing our freedom.
 
19
 
 In
characterizing love in such a manner, Sartre agrees to a certain extent with
Scheler that the notion of  romantic love has an egoistic aim. But must this
aim be reduced to mere egoism? Is there something else implicitly con-
tained in this structure that suggests a quite different aim? Or, perhaps,
can we understand this aim in a way that overcomes this essentially ego-
istic characterization?
For Scheler, Kierkegaard, and even Frankfurt, bestowal love is morally
superior to appraisal love because it is freely given and not motivated by
self-interest. According to Scheler, Christian love marked a radical rever-
sal of  love which freed the concept of  love from the egoism of  the Greek
notion. Love no longer relied on qualities in the beloved that pointed to
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higher forms of  truth or knowledge. Scheler and others see romantic love
as containing the same essential defect. Romantic love aims at knowledge
which is meant to benefit the lover, making him or her more complete, or
better able to understand his or her self. But I think that these criticisms
miss something important in the nature of  romantic love, and this is due
in part to an overemphasis on the moral importance of  bestowal. 
The idea of  love as a free bestowal is an attractive one. I suspect that
part of  the attraction comes from the influence of  our Christian and Kant-
ian moral heritage where the purity of  ethical acts is defined in opposition
to inclination, self-interest, and the instrumental reasoning required for
satisfying such. A love that is given without an expectation of  return is a
love that seems removed from the realm of  treating people as objects or
treating their qualities as items of  assessment and exchange. In this sense
bestowal love rejects the appraisal aspect of  the 
 
eros 
 
tradition and its
romantic descendant. But there is another side to appraisal that I believe
should not be reduced to objectification or some form of  economic
exchange and that helps to temper some of  the potential excess implied in
bestowal. Appraisal, at least in the context of  romantic love, is a necessary
feature. It is not that we simply assess the good and bad qualities of  a per-
son and then decide whether or not to love them, although part of  our love
will be a response to those qualities as they exist in a unique way in a par-
ticular individual. If  this were not the case then our love would be indis-
criminate as well as ignorant. It is perhaps reasonable that an omnipotent
and omniscient god (if  one exists) freely bestow love on all of  creation, and
it is perhaps a healthy ethical attitude for humans in some cases to aspire
to bestowal love; however, when it comes to particular personal relations
between human beings, romantic love may provide a better and more real-
istic model. 
The idea that romantic love is inferior to a bestowal-based love seems
to rely on presuppositions of  a Christian, or perhaps even Kantian,
nature. It is as if  allowing qualities in the beloved to play a part in deter-
mining the experience of  love somehow cheapens that love. I do not see
why this needs to be the case. Certainly an element of  bestowal plays a role
in romantic love in order to compensate for negative appraisals, as Singer
suggests,
 
20
 
 but this does not mean that appraisal or some appeal to objec-
tive qualities in the beloved is not required. It seems to me that bestowal
love divorced from appraisal gives rise to a form of  love that is just as
unhealthy as one based solely on appraisal. If  love is based only on
appraisal then it can be rightfully accused of  egoism or selfishness. Love
based solely on bestowal, on the other hand, can be seen as pure fantasy
and as egoistic in a different way. If  love depends solely on the one who
bestows without regard to the object of  such bestowal then there is the
danger of  it becoming a kind of  solipsism. Bestowal love is said to create
value in the beloved, but what kind of  value can this be if  it is ignorant of
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or divorced from the object of  the valuing? Should we attribute the power
to create value solely to the lover? In doing so are we not making the lover
into a kind of  god? 
We may look at this from the perspective of  the beloved. On one hand,
if  a person feels that she is loved only for her qualities (beauty, intelli-
gence, etc.) then she may feel that she is not loved for her own sake—that
unique configuration of  qualities that produces a particular experience of
beauty in the lover and provides a terminus for love’s aim. On the other
hand, if  love is only a bestowal which does not take into account the
beloved’s objective qualities, talents, beauty, efforts, and so forth, then she
may feel as if  these various aspects of  her identity have not been valued or
recognized. The love bestowed by the lover may seem indiscriminate to
her and she may feel that she could easily be replaced by someone else
with very different qualities. This would seem to point to a certain limita-
tion in agapic or pure bestowal love, at least when applied to certain types
of  personal relationships—what we call romantic relations and friend-
ships, for instance). Bestowal love without appraisal is too indiscriminate
to be a model for these types of  personal loves. 
I believe that the term appraisal itself  is insufficient to capture the full
sense of  what I want to oppose to a one-sided bestowal notion of  love.
When used in the context of  love, appraisal often seems to suggest that
love is a response only to someone who possesses loveable qualities. In
other words, the qualities of  the beloved determine the love. But there is
another dimension when it comes to taking into account the objective
qualities of  the beloved in love. To say that love depends in part on qual-
ities possessed by the lover can be understood to mean that love is some-
thing more than bestowal or appraisal alone. What I mean here is that love
(romantic love) is relational and, as such, relies on a dynamic of  giving,
receiving, and responding. One of  the limitations of  the bestowal-
appraisal opposition is that it focuses primarily on the position of  the
lover in terms of  a kind of  ontological isolation. The lover is seen either
to bestow love on the beloved or to love the beloved in terms of  an
appraisal of  his objective qualities. Romantic love, on the other hand, is
not adequately understood in terms of  either bestowal or appraisal, nor
is it to be simply understood as involving both if  we limit our understand-
ing of  these terms solely to an act of  the lover. Love, in the romantic sense,
involves a two-way dynamic and a two-way aim.
 
21
 
 Romantic love aims at
reciprocity even if  this is not always achieved. According to the bestowal
and appraisal models of  love, the failure to achieve reciprocity does not
present a major obstacle to love. In the context of  romantic love, however,
such a failure makes love seriously incomplete. 
Robert C. Solomon, in his book 
 
About Love: Reinventing Romance for
Our Times
 
, discusses the social dimension of  romantic love by viewing
love in terms of  an identity thesis. For Solomon, romantic love is neither
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a form of  egoism nor a disinterested love. Love according to Solomon
exists in a dialectical tension between self-identity and mutual identity.
 
22
 
It is in or through love that we gain an enriched sense of  our own identity
through the affirmation or approval of  our character and virtues provided
by the one who loves us. Not only is our self  enriched but it is enlarged as
we come to understand the world and our self  differently through coming
to understand the perspective, the language, and the metaphors of  another
person in the context of  an intimate relationship. Romantic love ideally
aims at equality, although actual romantic relationships often reflect the
asymmetry that Sartre describes in his account of  love. The dual emphasis
on equality and identity or selfhood is crucial to Solomon’s conception of
love and the notion of  romantic love in general, as are the notions of
choice and creativity. Romantic love as we know it emerged in a modern
context, influenced specifically by romantic philosophy and the political
philosophy of  liberalism. Romanticism emphasized creativity as well as
finding or creating one’s self  or identity, while liberalism promoted free-
dom, equality, and individual rights. The emphasis on choice, individual-
ity, and freedom has often led to the assumption (and often the reality)
that romantic love is self-centred, selfish, or a form of  egoism. But
Solomon argues convincingly that there is nothing inherent in this con-
cept to warrant such a conclusion. Romantic love, like other forms of  love,
is a cultural creation. It may have its basis or its motivation in other nat-
ural or biological realities such as desire, survival (understood in evolu-
tionary terms), and so on, but our understanding and construal of  this
concept is the result of  human creation or construction. This is no less true
of  the Christian notion of  
 
agapé
 
 or Frankfurt’s concept of  a disinterested
love. Although Frankfurt suggests that such love is natural, I believe that
only the desire that motivates such love is natural, and love conceived of
as disinterested is a created notion.
What is appealing about Solomon’s conception of  romantic love is the
fact that he leaves intact the tension that love creates. This tension is some-
what diffused by a conception of  love that sees love as either motivated by
an appraisal of  the beloved or by a bestowal on the part of  the lover. The
one-sidedness of  these conceptions removes a certain tension that remains
in romantic love. Romantic love, like other forms of  love, sets up an ideal
paradigm of  what love should be. It has often been thought that the ideal
implied in romantic love is an impossible one, as Sartre so forcefully
argues. Taken in its strictest logical sense, this is probably true, but it is in
the nature of  ideals that they are rarely if  ever fully realizable. In the case
of  romantic love as Sartre sees it, however, it is not merely the case that
the ideal is unreachable in practice, but that the ideal presents a logical
impossibility. The problem is that two human beings are trying to capture
each other’s freedom as if  this freedom were an object while at the same
time allowing each other to be free as subjects. The problem with Sartre’s
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claim in this case is that he mistakes what should rightly be considered a
practical problem or a problem of  practical knowledge for an ontological
problem (or a quasi-epistemological problem). The sense of  possession or
understanding of  another in a romantic relationship between two con-
scious subjects is not the same as the one-way relation between a person
and a thing, a subject, or an object. Even though we may at times treat
another person like an object, this does not preclude the possibility that,
at a practical level, we can communicate, relate, and even share an identity
with another person to some extent. Sharing an identity, coming to under-
stand oneself  through a relationship with another, and coming to under-
stand another through a sharing of  oneself  provide a practical, realizable
aim of  love. Solomon’s account acknowledges this and presents several
positive possibilities for achieving this goal. 
 
Love and Knowledge
 
I want to take a look now specifically at the problem of  knowledge in rela-
tion to love. I want to oppose the idea that the knowledge-seeking aspect
of  romantic love implies that such love is egoistic. Solomon suggests that
love need not be egoistic when we view love in relational terms as a form
of identity created by two lovers. The mutual identity created in romantic
love prevents both the lover and the beloved from succumbing to egoism
as a correct view of  personal identity on this account will never fully exist
in egoistic isolation but will be formed by the relationship. Singer, on the
other hand, seems to avoid egoism by claiming that love is both appraisal
and bestowal. One must look outside of  one’s self  in order to find qualities
in the lover which are the basis of  appraisal. Bestowal allows us to go
beyond mere appraisal by creating value which exceeds these appraisals.
Bestowal in this sense can be seen as a response to the lover’s self—a self
which includes beauty, intelligence, goals, creativity, and so on—but it is
also a response that is personal and departs from public forms of
appraisal. This is what makes the beloved seem more intelligent or beau-
tiful to the lover than he or she may seem to others.
A third aspect of  overcoming the problem of  egoism in romantic love,
which I have already hinted at and which is distinct from the attempts
made by Solomon and Singer, can be understood upon explicit examina-
tion of  the relationship between love and knowledge. Indeed, I believe
that knowledge plays a crucial role in helping us overcome egoism in the
context of  love. Romantic love or personal love, I would argue, requires
some knowledge of  the beloved in order for love to be authentic. The man
who falls madly in love with a woman whom he never gets to know is
rightly thought of  as experiencing infatuation rather than genuine love for
another person. In the same way, a one-sided love that does not possess
knowledge of  the beloved seems illusory. Knowledge of  the other is of
fundamental importance to romantic love (and friendship). The reciproc-
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ity demanded by such love makes knowledge of  the other possible. This
runs contrary to claims such as we find in Scheler and Levinas. For both
of  these thinkers knowledge gets in the way of  an authentic love (or, in
Levinas’s case, an authentic ethical relation) for another person. When
love is concerned with knowledge of  another, one does not allow the other
to be just who they are but one attempts to reduce them to sameness, to
use Levinas’s term,
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 or to make them part of  the whole, in Scheler’s lan-
guage.
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 That is, rather than allowing the other to be a free subject, we are
turning them into an object of  our knowledge, thus violating the spirit of
the Kantian imperative. As much as I sympathize with the Kantian idea
implicit here, I think that once again, as in the case of  Sartre, theoretical
consistency sometimes breeds folly in the practical field. I want to claim
that in love we cannot help but try to understand the other as an object
of  knowledge and through the concepts of  language. No matter how
much we respect the freedom of  another and no matter how purely we try
to relate to them 
 
qua 
 
human beings, we relate through the medium of  lan-
guage. I would even go further and say that as human beings we love
partly through language. Love is never pure in the sense of  being free from
knowledge, and when it is free from knowledge, it runs into the previously
stated problem of  becoming illusory. 
Through language, through concepts, through a reciprocal relation, we
come to learn that another person is a subject possessing freedom as
opposed to an object which can be possessed in an unambiguous manner.
Likewise, we learn that we possess an objective side which others see and
experience. Romantic love and friendship help us to see this other side of
our self  and allow us to get beyond our egoistic isolation. Lovers and
friends give us glimpses of  our public self. We also learn what it means to
love, not only through action—in other words, loving—but through an
understanding of  the idea of  love. There may be much in the idea of  love
that is natural and the impulse that gives rise to desire and fellow feeling,
but, as I have discussed early on, love is a created notion. According to
the life-attitude recommended by 
 
agapé
 
, one’s concern should be selfless,
unmotivated, and pure; but romantic love recommends something quite
different. The reciprocal aim of  this latter life-attitude may never be fully
realized in any pure form, but I believe that the aim itself  is both realistic
and authentic. Such a love should not try to reduce the other to a mere
means or an object or concept of  our language; indeed, the very authen-
ticity in this form of  love lies precisely in the struggle to come to know
another person without reducing them in this manner. Romantic love is a
mixed love, an “entangled love” (to use a variation of the Kierkegaardian
concept). It involves both knowledge and freedom. We must come to know
another person in order to be aware of  her interests, but we should never
let this knowledge become frozen so that we maintain a fixed concept of
the other. We must constantly allow our conception of the other to be
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transformed by her freedom as it is expressed in dialogue, communication,
through living together, and experiencing each other. This communication
can only achieve an authentic sense of  the other if  it is a two-way commu-
nication, a two-way love. There is no denying the difficulty involved in
such an enterprise, but to remove the difficulty and to make love a one-
way affair is itself  to engage in an inauthentic form of  love. Romantic love
demands reciprocity in a similar manner to friendship.
We will never get a first-person perspective of  the subjectivity of  another
person, but this fact does not negate the possibility of  gaining an under-
standing of  the other person that fulfills the demands of  love. Such
demands require practical knowledge, and this will often represent an
advance in our understanding of  the way that the other person sees the
world. When faced with the abstract philosophical problem of  other
minds, we may be sceptical about the possibility of  understanding another
person’s perspective, but when we examine the actual development of
close relationships, we see that advancement is often made towards such
understanding. The way we understand someone at the beginning of  a
romantic relationship or friendship is quite different from the way we
understand someone after years of  living together, learning from one
another, discussing important matters, and thinking together. In romance
especially, the early period of  infatuation often creates or allows for an
idealized and often distorted picture of  the other person, for the tendency
is to create a picture of  the other person as we want them to be. Over time
(at least in healthy relationships), however, that picture changes in a way
that is not merely the result of  the excitement or infatuation having faded:
we gain a greater understanding of  what the other person means by the
words they use or the body language they employ. Sometimes the expres-
sions and concepts used by the other become our own and allow us to
articulate our own experience of  selfhood in a new way. It is not a distor-
tion of  language to say that we come to “know” another person in this
way; the sense of  knowing here is not the strict epistemological sense of
having true belief. Although true belief  will inevitably be part of  such
knowing (e.g., it is important that we have the correct belief  about the
other person’s dislike of  sarcasm), it is more than this. Knowing another
person also involves developing sensitivity towards her affective states as
well. The notion of  empathetic understanding comes to mind. It is a mixed
concept of  knowing, one similar to Ilham Dilman’s term “contact.” Con-
tact, for Dilman, is neither a “knowing that” or a “knowing how,” to use
Ryle’s distinction. It does not mean that we simply know certain facts
about another person, nor does it imply that we know how to employ a
set of  techniques when interacting with that person. It is, rather, that we
have established a kind of  relationship with another person such that we
respond appropriately to them (at least most of  the time) on an emotive
and practical level. The kind of  knowing involved in contact, according
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to Dilman, requires a two-way understanding or acquaintance and can-
not simply be something that only one of  the parties possesses.
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 The dis-
tinction made in the German language between the verbs 
 
wissen 
 
and
 
kennen
 
 (both translated in English as “to know”) is instructive here. 
 
Wis-
sen 
 
characterizes our knowledge of  facts and concepts, whereas 
 
kennen
 
characterizes our knowledge of  people. To know a person or a subject
who possesses intentions, thoughts, feelings, character, as well as a self-
concept, is very different from knowing that one plus one makes two. Such
knowledge involves a form of  reciprocity, if  you will, due to the fact that
it is a mutual relating of  self-conscious beings. 
To suggest, as Scheler does, that Christian love is superior due to the
fact that it prioritizes action over knowledge is a bit misleading when
applied to love between individuals due to the dichotomy that is created
between acting and knowing. In the context of  personal love between
human beings, true loving requires some degree of  knowing. Bestowal will
be a part of  this, of  course, since even if  we possess knowledge of  the other
person that knowledge will be incomplete. Bestowal becomes a way of
dealing with that incompleteness. To bestow love on another is a creative
act which goes beyond a person’s objective qualities or the lover’s knowl-
edge of  those qualities. Bestowal is an imaginative act on the part of  the
lover which completes his picture of  the beloved. It is possible that this
imaginative act may involve illusory elements, but the illusory aspect is
less than it would be if  love were only bestowal. 
This picture of  love can be compared to certain accounts of  self-identity.
The picture that one has of  one’s own self  is always incomplete and rarely
only factual. To compensate for this, we create a narrative or imaginative
account of  our own self, which can lead to an unhealthy delusional sense
of  one’s own self. However, one could argue that viewing one’s self  in exis-
tentialist fashion as a discrete series of  facts or moments can be even more
unhealthy as a psychological strategy for dealing with life. Sartrean char-
acters such as Roquetin in 
 
Nausea 
 
do not present us with a picture of  a
person ideally suited to dealing with the practical necessities of  life even
if  such characters maintain a certain authenticity with their lucid view of
both self  and world. Sometimes certain illusions, or certain creative ways
of  understanding our self  and the world, provide us with a filter or a way
of dealing with the innumerable facts that confront us so that we are not
overwhelmed by that world.
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 Likewise, our experience of  another person
whom we love will involve both knowledge of  that person and a value or
image bestowed upon her that will, in an important way, transcend the
naked facts that constitute our knowledge of  her. Love is not merely a
response to facts or qualities of  the beloved. It is partly constituted by this
and relies on the knowledge one can attain regarding the beloved, but it
also relies on an attitude of  bestowal that elevates the value of  the beloved
above or outside the system of  public values. The valuing expressed in
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bestowal need not be considered entirely mysterious or illusory but should
be understood in terms of  a personal relation between lover and beloved.
What makes love more than knowledge is a bestowal inspired by feelings,
imagination, and creativity. What makes this bestowal more than a fan-
tasy are the qualities belonging to the other that affect our senses, our
imagination, and intelligence, in other words, our knowledge of  her.
To claim that a love based in knowledge is egoistic is problematic for a
number of  reasons. Knowledge in some sense takes us out of  egoism
because it is primarily not a private phenomenon. Knowledge, like lan-
guage itself, is public. Language may work as a means of  freeing us from
egoism. It is only when we allow language to become static or inflexible
that we are in danger of  losing the sense of  otherness that another person
embodies. This is why language and knowledge (in relation to the other)
must be understood in dialogic rather than absolute terms. Our knowledge
of the other that we inevitably formulate into concepts must be constantly
called into question by our hearing what the other has to say. Scheler, by
separating knowledge from love, presents an idealistic picture that is hard
to make sense of. A relationship without knowledge, concepts, or language
is not a human relationship.
Pure bestowal love, such as we see in the Christian notion of  
 
agapé
 
, as
well as in Harry Frankfurt’s more naturalized version, seems inadequate
at least as a characterization of  personal love between two conscious or
mature individuals. Bestowal may best characterize the relationship
between a parent and her young child where there is not the same possi-
bility for reciprocation, but romantic love (or friendship in certain con-
texts) seems better suited for adult relations. Bestowal love avoids a
certain difficulty in personal relations by its one-sided nature. One could
say that a pure appraisal love (such as 
 
eros
 
) does so as well. Bestowal
avoids the problem of  knowledge of  the other person. Bestowal love does
not require knowledge of  the other person or his qualities. A strict
appraisal love is a response to those qualities and is indeed conditioned
by them but it does not require a two-way relation between people. Both
approaches to love seem to escape the difficulty in mature human relations
that romantic love is willing to face head-on. Romantic love requires both
initiative on the part of  lovers (often taking the form of  bestowal) and a
response to each other’s qualities or actions. Romantic love recognizes the
incomplete nature of  human beings as well as our incomplete understand-
ing of  one another. Reconciliation suggests a theme whose aim is to over-
come our separation, estrangement, and incomplete knowledge of  the
other. This reconciliation will never be complete. There will always be
something unknown about the other and perhaps this is a good thing, but
the aim of  knowing the other and knowing oneself  through the other is a
healthy part of  love. The so-called unselfish love characterized by the
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agapic tradition presupposes a completeness possessed by God. This is
not a completeness that humans possess. 
 
Conclusion
 
What I have tried to show in this article is that romantic love is a form of
love that cannot be reduced to egoism. That this is so is evident when we
look at the nature of  interpersonal identity implied by the romantic rela-
tionship as well as the relation between love and knowledge. Romantic
love escapes egoism because on this model identity is social, formed by
others and specifically by the other whom one loves. Further, romantic
love aims at knowledge of  the other and does so in a reciprocal way. Lov-
ers escape the egoistic predicament as they come to know one another.
Knowledge of  the other brings one out of  their isolated egoism. Romantic
love relies on both a response to the other and one’s knowledge of  him as
well as a creative giving or bestowing which in part makes up for what is
lacking in that knowledge.
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